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Non-technical Summary
During the nineties, in many OECD countries a marked drop of government
investment spending has occurred. The reasons for this reduction are not very well
understood. While for some EU countries the consolidation pressure from the
Maastricht criteria might add to the explanation, this explanation does not help in
regard to countries for which EMU deficit limits are irrelevant. Furthermore, the
decline seems to stand in contradiction to insights from the globalisation debate. The
relative shift of public expenditures towards consumption spending is puzzling in
times of increasing factor mobility. With companies becoming more footloose, one
would expect government budgets to be restructured towards the needs of these
mobile factors which should benefit public investment versus consumption. With
this background, the paper tries to contribute to a better understanding of the
economic and political forces driving public capital formation in industrial
countries.
The theoretical framework is based on a model of budget optimisation: Fiscal
decision makers choose a budget where marginal vote losses of raising revenues
equal marginal vote gains from spending increases. This framework allows to derive
a testable relationship for the determinants of public investment. Generally speaking,
all developments that increase the marginal political benefits of public capital
formation (the demand side) and that reduce the marginal political costs of financing
it (the supply side) should increase investment. Among the factors that could thus
have an impact on public investment are: return on investment, political discount
factor, mobility of the tax base, political ideology, borrowing costs, sustainability of
public debt and the existence of constitutional debt limits.
The econometric part of the paper tries to identify which of these factors are most
relevant. For that purpose, country panels are estimated for 16 OECD countries for
the period 1980-1999 with the level of investment being the dependent variable and
appropriate proxies for the potential driving forces of investment as explanatory
variables. Furthermore, it is controlled for the business cycle and the impact of the
privatisation process in this period since this could otherwise bias the results.
The most robust results concern the level of hidden and open public debt – a high
debt level is associated with a low level of public investment. Thus the decline of
public investment in the nineties can be regarded as a consequence of fast growing
debt mountains between the 70s and the 90s. This results clearly underlines the costs
of public debt for future generations: In times of growing debt services it becomes
increasingly difficult to mobilise government revenues for new investment projects.
Furthermore, mobility of factors adds to the explanation. Although investment might
be a useful instrument to attract mobile factors (demand effect), its financing burden
deters mobile factors (supply effect).  According to these results, the supply effect
dominates the demand effect.
One further result concerns the impact of privatisation: this does not seem to have
played any role in explaining the decline in investment. The control variable was
insignificant. This is an uneasy insight: The excuse that the investment decline
might be a statistical deception due to the privatisation process is not valid.  In the
European context it is interesting to stress that according to the econometric results
the EMU deficit limits did not in a significant way add to the decline in investment.
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Abstract
This paper tries to explain the declining level of public investment in OECD
countries. The theoretical framework hints to the relevance of a number of demand
and supply factors – ranging from the yield of public investment to institutions like
the EU deficit limits. The econometric results indicate that the decline is largely due
to two developments: First to the pile-up of public debt since the 70s which in the
90s severely restricted ability to finance new investment. Second to the increasing
mobility of factors that has added to the financing difficulties. In contrast to that
neither the privatisation process nor EU deficit restrictions of the Maastricht Treaty
can explain the decline.
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11 Introduction
During the nineties in many OECD countries a marked drop of government
investment spending has occurred. Figure 1 depicts public capital formation in
relation to total budget and GDP for the big four EU countries, USA and Canada.
The graphs indicate that falling investment-GDP-ratios are not a consequence of a
shrinking size of government but rather result from a shift of government resources
towards consumption.
Figure 1: Public investment
(solid line: relation to budget, dotted line: relation to GDP)
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Source: OECD Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles database.
The reasons for this reduction are not very well understood. While for some EU
countries the consolidation pressure from the Maastricht criteria might add to the
explanation (BALASSONE/FRANCO, 2000), this explanation does not help in regard to
countries for which EMU deficit limits are irrelevant. Furthermore, the decline
seems to stand in contradiction to insights from the globalisation debate. The
relative shift of public expenditures towards consumption spending is puzzling in
times of increasing factor mobility. With companies becoming more footloose, one
would expect government budgets to be restructured towards the needs of these
mobile factors.
On the revenue side some developments can be interpreted in this way. In many
countries the fiscal burden is shifted away from corporate taxes towards indirect
2taxes and social security contributions.1 On the expenditure side, however, the
development stands in contrast to globalisation theory. Assuming that mobile agents
like multinational firms appreciate public investment spending more than
consumption spending one should expect an increase of public investment and not a
decline. This should hold in particular for the nineties which were characterised by
the abolition of many restrictions to capital flows and a boom of foreign direct
investment.
With this background, the paper tries to contribute to a better understanding of the
economic and political forces driving public capital formation in industrial
countries. At the same time it tries to fill a gap in the empirical literature on the
relationship between globalisation and budgetary policy. This empirical literature
(surveyed in SCHULZE/URSPRUNG, 1999, and VAUBEL, 2000) so far has largely
ignored investment spending. Only two studies are known to the author, where a
relationship between globalisation indicators and public investment is tested “by the
way” without paying particular interest to this expenditure variable and to the
political-economic processes determining public investment. RODRIK (2000) who is
mainly interested in the puzzle of a positive correlation between globalisation
indicators and government consumption also includes cross section regressions for
investment-GDP-ratios based on a large sample of more than a hundred countries.
The analysis is based of data averages for two periods: 1985-1989 and 1990-1992.
RODRIK finds regional dummies, a dummy for socialists in power (negative) and
openness (share of trade in GDP, positive) to be the only significant explanatory
variables for public investment. GARRETT (1998) executes panel estimations for 14
OECD countries between 1966 and 1990 for different expenditure categories, among
them also investment spending. In this regression, the two globalisation indicators
(trade and existence of restrictions imposed on international transactions as reported
annually by the IMF) are not significant, only cyclical variables have a measurable
impact on public investment.
These studies leave many questions unresolved. They end in the early nineties and
thus cannot account for integration boosts like the completion of the EU internal
market. Furthermore, important potential determinants of public investment are
missing. Although Garrett suspects that privatisation programmes could be behind
the decline of investment he does not test for this possibility.2 Furthermore it is
questionable whether globalisation indicators like trade-GDP-ratios really measure
the developments that are most relevant for public investment. Proxies for capital
costs, the political-economic rate of time preference and liquidity contraints are
                                          
1 SCHULZE/URSPRUNG (1999) survey the empirical literature on tax competition. The evidence
for some downward competition of corporate taxes is strong in studies based on (effective) tax
rates. Revenue based studies come to contradicting remarks.
2 See SCHIPKE (2001) for the driving forces behind the privatisation tendencies.
3missing. This paper tries to address these shortcomings by the integration of
appropriate variables.
In the following section 2 a framework is presented which allows to identify
potential political and economic determinants of public capital formation together
with a discussion of available variables. The section 3 presents the econometric
analysis based on an OECD country panel. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical determinants and available proxies
A basic insight of the political-economic theory on budget optimisation based on
probabilistic voting (see for example HETTICH/WINER, 1997) is the following: For
any expenditure item an optimising government under political competition will
choose the level where marginal vote losses of raising revenues equals marginal vote
gains from spending increases.
This basic concept is also helpful to derive a testable relationship for the
determinants of public investment. Generally speaking, all developments that
increase the marginal political benefits of public capital formation (the demand side)
and that reduce the marginal political costs of financing it (the supply side) should
increase investment. Table 1 and 2 summarise on that basis possible determinants
for public investment and suggests employable indicators.
Demand side:
Among the factors that lead to an increasing appreciation of public investment
among voters is its yield for the general economy. However, the relevance of future
returns on investment for today’s decision is affected by the political discount rate.
The larger the discount rate the less interest is paid to the returns on public
investment.
If enterprises for which public investment is an input factor are mobile this should
also positively influence the political demand for public investment since these
expenditure become a variable to attract foreign companies and thus to foster
employment and growth. The same holds in the case of mobile households for which
public investment has a direct positive impact on utility.
Furthermore, the ideology of governments concerning the role of the state in the
economy and spending priorities can be regarded as a demand factor.
Supply side:
From supply side considerations all factors tend to decrease equilibrium investment
that increase the costs of raising revenues. Real interest rates and debt sustainability
should matter. If borrowing costs increase or the debt situation comes close to a debt
4crisis this negatively affects the power of any government to raise revenues. The
same holds for binding institutional limits on deficit financing. Such limits exist in
EU countries with the EMU convergence criteria and the subsequent Pact for
Stability and Growth. Figure 1 above is suggestive in regard to these institutions’
relevance: The European countries all show a marked drop of public investment in
1997. This year was the basis for EMU convergence tests in May 1998. It appears as
if investment has been cut temporarily in the reference year in order to keep
government deficits below the 3 per cent ceiling of the Maastricht Treaty.
In addition, the following factors should reduce the optimal level of investment from
the supply side consideration: A low political discount rate since it leaves deficit
financing less attractive and a high mobility of the tax base since this restricts the
taxation power of a government.
Note that both the political discount rate and factor mobility thus have an impact on
optimum public investment through both the demand and the supply side – with
contradicting signs. Mobility of factors will only positively impact on public
investment if the demand effect (public capital formation leaves a location more
attractive) outweighs the supply effect (the financing needs drive out the mobile tax
base). Similarly, a small discount rate will only foster investment if the demand
effect (return on investment has a larger political impact) more than counterbalances
the supply effect (the burden of the debt is taken more seriously).
Table 1: Factors relevant for marginal political benefits of public investment
(demand side)
factor expected sign of
investment impact
indicators
return on investment + per capita income,
population growth
political discount rate - indicators of political
stability
mobility of firms for
which investment is
input
+ globalisation indicators
elected governments
preference concerning
the role of government
and spending priorities
?
(Rodrik, 2000: left
governments invest less)
share of left parties’ seats in
government coalition
5Table 2: Factors relevant for the marginal political costs of public investment
(supply side)
factor expected sign
of investment
impact
indicators
borrowing costs - real interest rate relevant for public
borrowing
risk of debt crisis - sustainability indicators like debt-
GDP-level or proxies for hidden debt
(age structure)
political costs of deficits
due to institutional
constraints
- Maastricht convergence criteria
variable
Pact for Stability and Growth variable
political discount rate + indicators of political instability
mobility of tax base - globalisation indicators
Tables 1 and 2 also include in the third column indicators that are used in this study
as proxies for each determinant of public investment (for sources see table in
appendix):
- The measurement of growth effects of public capital formulation is a demanding
task (see BALASSONE/FRANCO, 2000, for a short survey on that literature). Here, a
pragmatic way is chosen and some easily available structural variables are used
as proxies for the return to public capital formation: population growth –
measured by the fertility rate - and per capita income.
- The number of elections or cabinet reshuffles (EOC) in the last three years is
used as an indicator of political stability which stands for the political discount
rate of a country.
- Political preferences can be measured in terms of political orientation of the
government. The specific variable employed is the share of left parties’ seats in
the governing coalition (LIG).
- Real interest rates are an obvious specification for borrowing costs. These are
calculated ex post, i.e. as the difference between long term government bond
yields and the actual inflation rate.
- The debt-GDP-level is a rough but easily accessible sustainability indicator. It
has, however the problem, to be solely based on the explicit part of the public
debt. In order to take also account of the hidden part, the share of population
below the age of 14 is added to the explanatory variables – a low share indicating
a large hidden (demographically caused) public debt.
6- As suggested by the time series plot, a 1997 dummy for first wave EMU countries
can serve as a proxy for the effects of the Maastricht convergence criteria. 1997
was the budgetary period that decided over EMU membership in 11 countries. A
temporary cutback of public investment might have been used to fulfil the 3 %
deficit/GDP condition.3
Turning now to the variables measuring mobility of factors in an increasingly
globalised environment there is the problem of choice. Indicators measuring factor
mobility can be constructed on very different bases. Concepts can be direct and then
be based on the existence of obstacles to cross-border movements and transactions.
Or they can be price related and then look for deviations from the law of one price.
Quantity-related concepts focus on the size of cross-border transactions. It is hard to
say which of all available indicators really measure the kind of mobility that is most
relevant in the context of public investment optimisation. Therefore, a bundle of
indicators is used in this study, the choice also dictated by the difficulties to collect
sufficient time series cross section data for a sample of industrial countries. The
globalisation variables used are the following:
- Openness measured as (exports + imports)/GDP,
- the stock (end of year) of inward and outward portfolio investment, bank assets
and FDI – all relative to GDP.
- Apart from that for each country and year the number of restrictions is counted
out of four types of restrictions reported by the IMF in its Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions reports.
- A count variable – years since the liberalisation of the capital account – is the
final globalisation variable. The idea of this variable is that mobility is also a
function of time after a liberalisation has occured.
Two further groups of variables have to be added to the analysis.
- First cyclical variables in order to control for an impact of the business cycle.
Here the gap between potential and actual GDP and the unemployment rate is
used.
- Second a proxy for privatisation. In theory, privatisation of publicly owned
enterprises should not influence the level of public investment. According to the
rules of national accounting these units and their investment are ascribed to the
enterprise sector – whether the owner is the state or a private agent. However, in
the context of privatisation during the nineties reclassifications e.g. of public
utilities from general government to the private sector have occurred
(BALASSONE/FRANCO, 2000). Thus, the measured decline of public investment
might partially be a statistical artefact due to privatisation. In order to take care
                                          
3 The dummy is defined to be 0 in 1997 for non-EU countries and for Denmark, Sweden and the
United Kingdom where EMU membership was in that time no political objective.
7for this possibility, a proxy for public property is used: property income received
by the government. A 3-year-moving-average of this time series is calculated in
order to limit the cyclical pattern likely to characterise this series.
The table in the appendix informs about all data sources and summarises the
specifications employed in the regressions.
3 The econometric evidence
In the following panel estimations are performed for up to 16 OECD countries.4
Estimations are based on the period 1980-1999. A dynamic specification (the lagged
dependent variable is among the explanatory variables) is chosen, estimation
technique is OLS with White heteroscedasticity-consistent covariances. There are
two specifications of the dependent variable: public investment relative to GDP and
relative to total government expenditures – the latter being more meaningful in times
of a changing size of the state.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 show the results of a specification including all those
variables suggested in the preceding part. Apart form the lagged endogenous only
the debt related variables and globalisation variables turn out to reach at least a 10
per cent level of significance. The significant debt variables have the expected sign:
A larger debt tends to dampen investment. The mobility related variables suggest the
dominance of the supply dimension in the optimisation on public investment: A high
mobility measured as stocks of foreign bank assets and liabilities or as years since
capital account liberalisation dampens investment. The LIG variable is in both
specifications near the 10 per cent level: the sign is in line with the finding of
RODRIK (2000) that left governments tend to invest less.
The next step – the regressions in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 – are the result of
eliminating those variables being far from significance. The results do not change
very much apart from the finding that the modest significance of the left parties
variable is not robust.
The switching significance between the variables indicating open and hidden public
debt points towards a multicollinearity problem. The same could be the case with
respect to the globalisation variables and their lacking significance in the column (4)
specification. In order to cope with this problem there is a final estimation
specification based on a preceding calculation of principle components. Both for the
two debt variables and for the three mobility variables (bank assets/liabilities,
number of restrictions, years since liberalisation) the first principle component is
                                          
4 Included are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and USA. Lacking data lead
to the exclusion of Canada, Japan and Norway in the full specification (table 3, columns 1 and
3).
8calculated and then included as an explanatory variable in a panel regression. Table
4 reports the results. The debt variables are indeed jointly highly significant, the
same does not hold for the mobility variables. Again the importance of Rodrik’s left
parties variable is not supported.
4 Conclusion
From theoretical considerations a whole range of variables could be important for
the decision on public investment and therefore be able to explain its decline in
recent years. The empirical evidence of this study only supports the importance of
two variable groups: the debt and mobility related indicators.
The most robust results concern the level of hidden and open public debt – a high
debt level is associated with a low level of public investment. Thus the decline of
public investment in the nineties can be regarded as a consequence of fast growing
debt mountains between the 70s and the 90s. This results clearly underlines the costs
of public debt for future generations: In times of growing debt services it becomes
increasingly difficult to mobilise government revenues for new investment projects.
Furthermore, mobility of factors adds to the explanation. Although investment might
be a useful instrument to attract mobile factors (demand effect), its financing burden
deters mobile factors (supply effect).  According to these results, the supply effect
dominates the demand effect.
Rodrik’s finding about left governments being associated with lower investment
levels does not survive in this richer specification. One further result concerns the
impact of privatisation: this does not seem to have played any role in explaining the
decline in investment. The control variable was insignificant. This is an uneasy
insight: The excuse that the investment decline might be a statistical artefact due to
the privatisation process is not valid.  In the European context it is interesting to
stress that the EMU deficit limits did not in a significant way add to the decline in
investment.
9Table 3: Panel regression, fixed effects, OLS with White heterosecedasticity-
correction – probability in brackets – bold coefficients with at least
10% significance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent
variable:
investment/
GDP
investment/
GDP
investment/
total public
expenditure
investment/
total public
expenditure
Explanatory
variables:
dependent (-1) 0.487 (0.00) 0.631 (0.00) 0.448 (0.00) 0.644 (0.00)
income p. capita -0.000 (0.91) - -0.000 (0.93) -
fertility rate 0.003 (0.47) - 0.009 (0.27) -
EOC -0.000 (0.47) - -0.001 (0.13) -
LIG -0.002 (0.13) -0.001 (0.50) -0.005 (0.13) -0.002 (0.43)
real interest rate -0.016 (0.66) - -0.047 (0.49) -
debt-GDP -0.0001 (0.26) -0.0002 (0.00) -0.0001 (0.41) -0.0004 (0.00)
pop. share < 14 0.001 (0.26) -0.000 (0.32) 0.003 (0.02) -0.000 (0.86)
EMU 1997
dummy
-0.001 (0.35) - -0.002 (0.45) -
output gap 0.000 (0.54) - 0.001 (0.24) -
unemployment
rate
0.000 (0.57 - 0.000 (0.81) -
property income -0.103 (0.38) - -0.268 (0.26) -
openness -0.003 (0.71) - 0.000 (0.99) -
portfolio
investment
-0.001 (0.83) - 0.000 (0.97) -
bank
assets/liabilities
-0.006 (0.10) -0.005 (0.04) -0.013 (0.09) -0.005 (0.25)
FDI 0.007 (0.31) - 0.014 (0.34) -
nb. of restrictions -0.001 (0.25) -0.0003 (0.61) -0.004 (0.09) -0.001 (0.40)
years since
liberal.
-0.001 (0.01) -0.000 (0.75) -0.001 (0.00) 0.000 (0.76)
adj. R2 0.91 0.95 0.93 0.97
number of
countries/
observations
13/175 16/239 13/175 16/239
sample 1980-1998 1980-1999 1980-1998 1980-1999
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Tabel 4: Panel regression, fixed effects, OLS with White heterosecedasticity-
correction – probability in brackets – bold coefficients with at least
10% significance
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: investment/GDP investment/total public
expenditure
Explanatory variables:
dependent (-1) 0.651 (0.00) 0.649 (0.00)
LIG 0.0009 (0.45) -0.002 (0.39)
principle component debt
variables
-0.0001 (0.00) -0.0004 (0.00)
principle component
mobility variables
-0.0000 (0.73) -0.0000 (0.83)
adj. R2 0.951 0.97
number of countries/
observations
16/237 16/237
sample 1980-1999 1980-1999
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Appendix: Variable definitions and sources
Variable name Specification employed in regression Source
public investment OECD FPBC
GDP OECD FPBC
fertility rate Eurostat
income per capita (in
PPS)
Eurostat
EOC: elections or
cabinet reshuffles
3 year moving sum Keesing’s Record of World
Events, Lane/McKay/Newton
(1997): Political data handbook
OECD, Archiv der Gegenwart
LIG: share of left
parties’ seats in
governing coalition
Archiv der Gegenwart
real interest rates long term government bond yield – CPI
inflation
bond yield from IMF IFS, CPI
inflation from OECD FPBC
debt-GDP-level OECD FPBC
B14: share of population
below age of 14
Eurostat
1997EMU qualification
period dummy
1 in 1997 for first wave EMU
countries, 0 otherwise
openness (imports+exporte)/GDP IMF IFS
FDI: Foreign direct
investment
(sum of stocks of inward and outward
FDI)/GDP
IMF IFS
Portfolio: International
portfolio investment
(sum of stocks of international portfolio
investment assets and liabilities)/GDP
IMF IFS
Bank: Bank foreign
assets and liabilities
(sum of stocks of bank foreign assets
and liabilities)/GDP
IMF IFS
Number of restrictions counts dummies for the existence of
four restrictions (yes=1, no=0):
1. multiple exchange rates
2. restrictions to capital account
transactions
3. restrictions to current account
transactions
4. obligation to surrender export
proceeds
IMF EAER
Years since liberalisation Years since restrictions to capital
account transactions have been
abolished
IMF EAER
Output gap OECD FPBC
Unemployment rate OECD FPBC
Property income received
by the government
3 year moving average of property
income/GDP
OECD FPBC
IMF IFS: International Financial Statistics; IMF EAER: Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions; OECD FPBC: Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles database.
